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A well-known feature of pollution control with tradable quota rights is that the benefits 
to ownership will capitalize into prices of the quota. Quota present a unique opportunity 
to examine the effect of risks introduced by governmental programs because all the 
return to quota is dependent upon these programs. The uncertainty of future regulatory 
action results from the probability that the stream of incomes could be reduced 
(portfolio risk) by policy variation or stopped (default risk) by a substantial switch or 
shock in policy regime. Eliminating the quota program is the extreme case of default 
risk, as it would terminate the quota benefits. 
The paper concentrates on the paradox that environmental regulation can provoke 
economic and environmental inefficiencies because of policy uncertainty. The theory on 
investment under uncertainty argues that when future returns are uncertain, an 
opportunity to wait and see has some (quasi) option value. Under uncertainty, 
investments and disinvestments will take place at respectively higher and lower levels of 
returns creating an inaction interval. This interval means that returns to quota can vary 
over a wide range before trade takes place and offers a new, theoretical explanation for 
the failure of marketable permit systems. 
The objectives of this paper are threefold. First, the option value theory is employed 
to forge a natural connection between political uncertainty and quota price volatility. 
Second, based on the option value theory, a switching regime model is developed for 
investing and disinvesting in quota. Third, the empirical evidence for the Dutch 
Phosphate Quota Program indicates that policy risks led to asset fixity. Consequently, 
the market of tradable phosphate quota was not effective with major negative 
implications for both economic and environmental efficiency.  
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1. Introduction  
 
A well-known feature of pollution control with tradable quota rights is that the benefits 
to ownership will capitalize into prices of the quota. Capitalization of program benefits 
reflects expectations about future policy. Therefore, the value of policy created assets 
reflects farmers’ assessment of the level, variability and duration of future returns to 
policy (Sumner and Wilson, 1998). Quota present a unique opportunity to examine the 
effect of risks introduced by governmental programs directly because all the return to 
quota is dependent upon these programs. The uncertainty of future regulatory action 
results from the risk that the stream of incomes could be reduced or stopped by a change 
in policy regime. It is useful to distinguish to types of risk. “Portfolio risk” refers to the 
effect of perceived policy variation whereas ‘default risk’ refers to the probability of a 
substantial switch or shock in policy regime (Barichello, 1996). Eliminating the quota 
program is the extreme case of default risk, as it would terminate the quota benefits. 
Two related strands of micro-economic literature recognize the possible micro 
economic effects of political uncertainty: studies of capital asset price volatility and 
recent work on investment under uncertainty. Barichello (1996) and Sumner and Wilson 
(1998) investigated rates of discounts and rates of return for dairy quota in Canada and 
the US using insights from the capital asset pricing model (Black and Scholes, 1973). 
They found the price of the dairy quota to be well below the expected capitalized value, 
indicating high risk premiums for policy uncertainty. Similar results have been reported 
for tradable quota in other agricultural commodities such as broilers and eggs, tobacco, 
and peanuts (Lerner and Stanbury, 1985; Rucker and Thurman, 1990; Sumner, 1988). 
High discount values are also found for quota of non-agricultural commodities such as 
textiles (Barichello, 1996).  
The theory on investment under uncertainty argues that when future returns are 
uncertain, an opportunity to wait and see has some (quasi) option value
i (Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994). Under uncertainty, investments and disinvestments will take place at 
respectively higher and lower levels of returns creating an inaction interval. Recently this 
inaction interval has been put forward as an alternative explanation for hysteresis or 
asset fixity. Richards (1996) was the first to empirically confirm hysteresis in quota 
investments for the case of Canadian dairy farming. This study also showed that the 
hysteresis indirectly causes slow adjustment in other inputs resulting in economic 
inefficiency. These negative indirect effects of quota fixity are reported also in the 
literature on structural developments in agriculture (e.g., Burrell, 1989; Rucker et al., 
1995; Boots et al., 1997).  
This paper addresses the system of manure production rights in The Netherlands. 
Dutch legislation allows a total manure production from all animal sources of up to 125 
kg of phosphate (P2O5) per hectare of land. Farmers producing more manure in terms of 
phosphate need additional quota. This case is used to make three contributions to the 
literature. First, the option value theory is employed to forge a natural connection 
between political uncertainty and quota price volatility. Second, the analysis shows light 
on the further tightening of environmental regulations in the context of a quota system   4 
and specifically on the way this was formalized for Dutch animal agriculture. Third, the 
empirical results indicate that policy risks led to hysteresis. Consequently, the market for 
tradable phosphate quota was not effective with major negative implications for both 
economic and environmental efficiency. Similar failures of marketable permit programs 
have been observed elsewhere, most notably  with the five nutrient trading programs in 
the U.S. where no trades were made at all (Hoag and Hughes-Popp, 1997).        
The next section reviews the Dutch phosphate quota program. The third section 
provides a new, theoretical explanation for the failure of marketable permits and sections  
four and five presents an application to the Dutch phosphate program. Section six 




2. An Overview of the Dutch Phosphate Quota Program
ii 
 
The system of manure production rights (manure quota) in The Netherlands was 
introduced in two steps: in 1987 for the production of manure from cattle, swine and 
poultry, and in 1992 for the production of manure from sheep, goats, ducks, foxes, 
nutria and rabbits. Each farm was ascribed a “reference amount” based on the inventory 
of animals and standards for the manure production for each specific animal category 
measured in kilograms of P2O5 per year
iii. On Dec. 31, 1986 (and again on Dec. 31, 
1991), all land either owned or long term leased (minimal 6 years and officially 
registered) used for agricultural purposes was assessed. The difference between the 
reference amount and the assessed acreage based phosphate rights was used to establish 
a distinction between manure surplus farms (with manure production in excess of 125 
Kg of P2O5 per hectare) and manure deficit farms (with phosphate production below 125 
Kg/ha). A deficit farm can still increase animal production on the basis of unused land 
based manure production rights. For a manure surplus farm such an increase in 
production capacity is only possible with an increase in the reference quantity of manure 
production rights.   
 
Trading rules  
  The regulation indirectly caused a moratorium hampering the adaptation and 
investment processes required for resolving the national manure problem. To counteract 
these limitations part of the production rights became tradable by January 1, 1994. For 
each farm the reference amount was converted into “manure production rights” (manure 
quota) to indicate the change in policy. In contrast to the homogeneous reference 
amount, manure production rights became highly differentiated to restrict the trading. 
This was done in three steps.  
First, a farm’s total manure quota was officially divided into two parts: land based 
part and non-land based part. The first part amounts to 125 kg of P2O5 times the number 
of hectares of land on the farm, whereas the non-land based part is calculated as the 
difference between a farm’s reference amount and the land based quota. Second, each 
farm’s non-land based quota was allocated to specific animal categories (cattle & 
turkeys, pigs & chickens, others) reflecting the situation on the specific farm
iv. The non-
land-based quota became tradable with trading being restricted across the three animal   5 
categories. Third, trading of the animals-based phosphate quota is also geographically 
restricted to keep the animal population from further increasing in the concentration 
areas. Transferring quota is allowed within regions and from a manure surplus region 
into a deficit region, but prohibited from a manure deficit region into a manure surplus 
region. There are two manure-surplus regions
v: The East with the province of 
Gelderland and a large part of Overijssel and The South with the province of Noord-
Brabant and a small part of Limburg (Figure 1). Finally, there is a 25% reduction in 
quota when the transferable animal based quota is actually sold to curb the national 
manure surplus. This reduction applies to all animal categories. 
As before there is still a distinction in manure surplus and manure deficit farms. If a 
manure surplus farm acquires additional land, the land-based quota that goes with it 
automatically  ‘sinks’ into the animals based quota. So, for a surplus farm, acquiring 
more land reduces the tradable part of the quota by increasing the land-related share and 
reducing the non land-related share. This implies that the purchasing of animal based 
quota is the only way to increase production capacity for a surplus farm
vi. 
  
Policy uncertainty  
The future of the quota system was uncertain from the beginning because of expected 
changes in policy. In 1993 the central agreement between the Ministries of Agriculture 
and the Environment and the farmers’ union (Landbouwschap) was that by 1998 the 
quota system would become obsolete
vii with the introduction of a nutrient accounting 
scheme at the farm level (Breembroek et al., 1996). The scheme included strict nutrient 
application standards for phosphate and nitrogen per hectare and a prohibitive tax on 
any surpluses. With such a scheme a farm’s legal production capacity would not be 
determined by the amount of quota but by its capacity of manure disposal, either by land 
application on the own farm or by hauling it to a crop farm in the deficit region. The 
scenario was met by massive protest from farmers, forcing union leaders to distance 
themselves publicly from the plan (Frouws, 1997). Besides, the plan was met with 
serious doubts on the part of the environmental organizations and drinking water 
suppliers
viii. 
In October 1995, the definitive governmental proposal was launched. Nutrient 
accounting would become obligatory for both phosphate and for nitrogen. Nutrient 
surpluses above the waste standard would be subject to a high tax to ensure manure 
disposal to the deficit regions. Added to the political agenda by mid July 1997 was a 25 
percent reduction in animal numbers specifically for the swine sector. Note that the latter 
is identical to a cut in swine quota. Competing farmer action groups (including a radical 
union of pig farmers, Nederlandse Vakbond Varkenshouders or NVV) voiced their 
protest and attacked with renewed vigor eager to gain time. Eventually, on January 1, 
1998 the nutrient scheme was enacted but without abolishing the quota system. Instead 
the quota systems was further detailed by separating the swine quota from those for 
chickens and broilers as of September 1, 1998. A general 10 percent reduction in swine 
quota by farm became effective by the same date. This reduction was part of the Pig 
Farming Restructuring Act (Wet Herstructurering Varkenshouderij), aimed at reducing 
the generated manure and the pig herd by 25% by the year 2000 (with 1995/1996 as 
base year). The act also included stricter health and veterinary requirements for the pig   6 
production industry. Originally the Act passed the legislative hurdle. However, it became 
subject to litigation between the NVV and the Dutch government and, therefore, halted 
until January 2000. On January 20, 2000, the Court in The Hague declared the 10% 
reduction in the size of the pig herd as enacted on September 1, 1998 legitimate. 
However, the court decision exempted the second generic reduction by 15% that was 
announced for 2000.  
Even though quota became tradable by January 1994, trade was not observed until 
spring of 1996 and the number of transactions has been limited in relation to the number 




3. A Conceptual Model   
  
To interpret the policy setting we limit our analysis to the surplus regions, i.e. we 
assume that all farms are surplus farms and that increasing production capacity can only 
be achieved by buying animals based quota from another farmer within the same surplus 
region. 
Let there be two types of producers in the sense that they have identical amounts of 
quota,  M,  but different technical opportunities (Figure 2). The firms’ marginal cost 
curves, MC1 and MC2 are held to be increasing and convex in output. Assuming that the 
market price of the output, P, exceeds the marginal cost of production, possession of 
quota is valuable. The value of the marginal product of quota is the difference between 
the price of the output and marginal costs. The difference in marginal cost between the 
two farmers implies that the fixed amount of output as associated with quota MT = M1 + 
M2 is not produced at minimum cost.  
Introducing trade implies producers with low cost of production will buy or lease 
quota from producers with higher cost. From Figure 2 it can be seen that in equilibrium 
an amount of ∆ M units of quota will be transferred from farmer 2 to farmer 1. The 
observed market clearing lease rate will be equal to ATP* which is the difference between 
the expected market price and the marginal costs of production MCT . Both the high cost 
and the low cost producer will have an increase in producer surplus. Figure 2 also gives 
the intuition to the impact of a general reduction in quota. Assuming that the marginal 
costs curves remain unchanged, a shift of the M1 = M2 limit to the left would lead to 
higher quota rental rates.  
 From the discussion above it follows that a system of tradable production quota is 
of major benefit to both sellers and buyers compared to quota as a strict limit to 
production. In the Dutch phosphate quota system users of quota are all owners of quota 
In that situation, farmers in general will be in favor of the tradable quota system to stay 
in place   they would all suffer a loss in asset values with phasing out of the system. 
 The Dutch phosphate quota system does not allow leasing   quota can only be 
acquired by purchase and the trade is open to farmers only. The classical NPV rule 
implies that investment in quota is profitable when the differential between the 
discounted expected future returns (capturing variability in output price P and MC) and 
the quota price is at least equal to the irreversible entry cost, i.e. the transaction costs of   7 
acquiring quota. The differential however is uncertain as it is affected by the uncertainty 
of future environmental policy. Stricter rules on animal waste disposal or the 
introduction of a pollution tax would lead to an upward shift in MC, lower returns to 
quota and a reduction in the volume of trade. The phasing out of the quota program 
would make the quota valueless and would lead to complete inaction on the quota 
market. 
 Let R denote the differential between the discounted future returns and the quota 
price and let k denote transaction costs of acquiring quota. It is optimal to buy quota as 
long as R > k. To account for uncertainty, we assume the differential, R, follows a 
geometric Brownian motion. Further we allow for the possibility that, at some random 
point in time, R may take a Poisson jump because of a change in the policy system. So, 
the asset return equation is
ix:  
 
Rdq Rdz Rdt dR − + = σ µ       ( 1 )  
 
where µ , σ  and dz are the mean growth rate, the standard deviation and the increment of the 
Brownian process; dq denotes the increment of the Poisson process, and dz and dq are 
independent. Equation (1) implies that current returns to quota ownership are known but 
future values are lognormally distributed and that at each point in time there is a small chance 
of a change in q affecting the original return. After this, the returns continue fluctuating as 
before until another event happens. Notice that this includes the possibility of the shift being 
permanent.  
To interpret equation (1), let the Poisson jump take the form of a drop in returns denoted 
by a fixed percentage θ  of R and its probability by λ , that is  -Rdq = -λ dtθ R. The expected 
rate of change of R now is not µ  but instead is (1/dt) Ε (dR)/R  = µ  -λθ . Thus the policy risk 
reduces the expected rate of change of R and it also contributes to the variance of the rate of 
change of R.  
  Applying Ito’s lemma to R provides an expression for the expected gain from owning 
quota over time, Ε  {dF(R)}:  
    
{} dt ] R ) [( F ) R ( F dt ) R ( ' ' F R dt ) R ( ' F R )} R ( dF { θ λ σ µ Ε − − − + = 1 2 2
2
1  (2) 
 
where the higher order terms of the Taylor series expansion are ignored and primes 
denote derivatives, i.e. F′ (R)= dF(R) /dR.  Dividing the expression in (2) by dt, and 
setting it equal to the normal net returns to quota investment, provides the arbitrage 
condition for continuing to wait and see or to invest in (additional) quota (Pindyck and 
Dixit, 171):  
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where Fb (R) is the value of the investment opportunity. The equilibrium condition for a 
producer to continue to use quota or to sell it differs in the sign of the per period 
dividend:   8 
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2
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where  Fs (R) is the value of the opportunity to sell. The solutions to the arbitrage 
equations (3) and (4) take the form (Dixit, 1989: 626-627): 
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where A and B are constants. The optimal solution for A and B requires that at the 
margin of investing and disinvesting the earnings must be equal after deducting the entry 
or exit cost (value matching condition):  
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where k denotes the entry cost as before; m denotes the exit costs, and RH and RL are the 
investment and disinvestment trigger, respectively. In addition the smooth pasting 
condition requires that at the margin the increments in earnings are identical:  
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To simplify these non-linear equations we recall that the literature generally concludes 
that trade in marketable permits is limited, i.e. that R is small. In that case the probability 
of R rising to a level inducing investment is very low and we can assume A = 0  (cf. 
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The triggers for investment and disinvestment in quota, RH  and RL , can now be denoted 
as: 
 


































1      (9) 
Equation (9) demonstrates how the RH and RL trigger differs from the NPV triggers per 
period,  kr  and -mr. The gap is determined by the growth rate, µ , of the Brownian   9 
process and by β . The latter is defined in terms of the diffusion-jump process in equation 
(1) and can be written as (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994: p.171):   
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Equation (10) applies when it is unknown whether the quota system will change and also 
when changes may take place. Equation (11) describes the situation in which the change 
of the quota system is permanent. Both equations demonstrate that portfolio and default 
policy risk (change in σ  and in λ  respectively) have disproportional impacts on the 
trigger values.  
The difference between the two trigger values, RL and RH , means that returns to 
quota can vary over a wide range before investment or disinvestment take place and 
offers an theoretical explanation for lack of trade in marketable permits. The practical 
relevance of the explanation is an empirical question.  
    Following Richards and Patterson (1998) a linear approximation was used for the 
option value in equation (9). The market situation for quota can then be described by 
three conditions:  
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where C denotes the transaction cost and OH and OL are the option values of investing 
and desinvesting in quota, respectively. 
Under the second regime in equation (12), policy uncertain is absent and the market 
of quota trades is efficient. Under the first regime, the differential is more than the 
transaction cost which is the option value of remaining inactive. Similarly, the third 
regime represents the case where the differential is negative which indicates the option 
value of holding on to active quota in the hope of changes in policy that would increase 




4.  Empirical Model   
 
Empirical assessment reveals  which one of the three conditions given in equation (12) 
prevails and enables a verification of the impact of policy risk on quota transfer for the 
phosphate quota system in the Netherlands. Recall that R is the differential between the   10 
capitalized returns to quota use and the quota price. This differential is attributed to 
unobservable transaction costs and option values in the quota market. Combining this 
definition of R and equation (12) the empirical model was specified as follows: 
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where Wt are earnings of quota use; rt is the interest rate;
i
t Q is the observed quota price 
in region i, transaction t; C
i is the transaction cost of buying or selling quota; O
i
  is the 
option value of acquiring quota or selling quota; ν  is a normally distributed  i.i.d. 
variable; and υ  is a half normal random variable truncated at zero from below and 
distributed independent of  ν . The specification reflects that quota prices are determined 
in local markets i in line with the regulation that trade is only allowed within the two 
surplus regions and not between these regions. Returns to quota use, W, were not 
regionally differentiated. Given the size of the Netherlands (approximately 150 by 200 
miles) and the well-developed infrastructure, effect of distances on farm gate prices for 
outputs and variable inputs is very small. 
Hypothesis tests of the probabilities l1 and l2 constitutes an assessment of the extent 
of policy risks. If equation (13c) prevails, policy risks are of no significance. In case of 
equation (13a), there is a positive option value. In the policy setting described above this 
difference is the option value of waiting and seeing what might happen with the quota 
program before buying quota. This situation represents a state of surplus of quota. In the 
case of equation (13b), quota prices paid are higher than the discounted earnings minus 
the acquisition costs which would imply a shortage of quota.  
We also considered an alternative specification alternative to (13a)-(3c)  where a 
binary variable was added to the option values OH and OL. This variable takes a value of 
1.0 beginning in July 1997 to account for the change in policy by the announcement of a 
25 percent reduction in quota for each pork producer. The effect of this announcement 
in terms of the switching regime model is unclear. One perspective would be to consider 
the announcement a reduction in policy uncertainty, i.e. a confirmation that the quota 
system was to remain with higher marginal quota values in the new situation (see the 
discussion of Figure 2). The opposite view would be to consider the announcement as an 
increase in default policy risk.    
 To estimate the probabilities l1 and l 2 of the two specifications for the switching 
regime model were chosen in order to maximize the log of the likelihood function 
(Sexton et al., 1991; Richards and Patterson, 1998):  
   11 
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Z λθ σ µ  and φ and Φ  are the 
density and the cumulative density function of the standard normal variable, respectively. 
In the alternative specification, a variable D times a dummy was added to C  + O to 
distinguishing the period after July 1997. The parameters C , O , D , l1, l2, σ υ  and σ ν  are 
estimated for each region i by maximizing the log of (14).  
The only data used in the estimation were quota prices, earning of quota use and the 
interest rate. Data for quota prices comprised a series of 166 and 103 individual 
transactions in quota for swine in the region south and east, respectively. These series 
cover the 26-month period April 1996-May 1998. Earnings were measured by the 
returns to labor in guilders per pig place in finishing swine production. Returns to labor 
was chosen instead of the net returns to take account of the inelastic labor supply in 
Dutch agriculture. This information is available on a monthly basis (J.H. Wisman, 
personal communication, LEI-DLO, 1998). Because of the considerable delivery lags of 
quota use, returns Wt were based upon expected future earnings instead of current 
earnings. In the estimation, the average returns to labor over the last 12 months was 
used as a rational expectation of these future earnings. Finally, the returns per pig place 
had to be reformulated per unit of quota. To increase the production capacity by one pig 
place, 7.4 kg of phosphate quota are required. When quota is acquired only 75% can 
actually be used (see section 2). So, to construct the data for Wt the 12-month averages 
of the return to labor were divided by 9.87 (= 7.4*4/3). In addition monthly data were 
used on interest rates for r. Table 1 provides summary statistics for quota prices, earning 





The estimation was conducted using the NLPNRA (Newton-Raphson method) and the 
NLPFDD routines in SAS/IML version 7.0. The latter routine enables the variance of   12 
the parameters to be estimated by the evaluation of the Hessian at the maximum 
likelihood estimates (Green, 1993: 115). Table 2 shows the model estimates both for the 
two-region average and for the regional markets separately. 
Estimates of the average phosphate quota model (model 1) for the pooled data 
support the evidence of inaction on the quota market. Market equilibrium is absent and 
the option value of 91.80 implies that the trigger to invest in quota is significantly over 
the NPV trigger estimated here to be 8.85. Relaxing the assumption that the option 
values are constant for both surplus regions permits an assessment of differences in 
efficiency of the quota market for the two regions. It may be that the market in one of 
the two regions particularly caused the overall inefficiency. The sets of regional 
estimates bear this out. The probability of a wait and see attitude is considerably higher 
larger for the region East where the estimated option value is also much higher. 
  Model 1 is subject to rather restrictive assumption regarding the option value even 
when estimated for the two regions separately. In particular, it is assumed that the 
option values are constant over the entire range of the data. Model 2 includes an 
additional variable to test for the impact of default policy risk, i.e. the risk of a general 
cut in quota at some future date. The announcement of a policy plan including such a 
future cut in July 1997 let to significantly higher option values and less efficient markets. 
These results are consistent with the effects of a Poisson jump. Notice that the policy 
announcement particularly affected the quota market in the south.  
  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Based on the option value theory this paper has developed a switching regime model for 
the market of tradable permits. The model enables an evaluation of the market 
inefficiency caused by both expected changes in policy and a potential (partial) 
termination of the permit system. The threshold model was applied to phosphate quota 
for pork production in The Netherlands. The results strongly suggest that this market is 
characterized by threshold behavior. The estimated option value was estimated as 
positive which indicates a wait and see attitude regarding investment. There were 
considerable differences in the estimated probabilities of the two threshold regimes 
between regional markets. In all cases equilibrium on the quota markets was estimated 
to be virtually absent. In most cases a surplus of quota was observed. The announcement 
of a policy change in mid July 1997 was found to have further disturbed the market, 
particularly in the southern region.   
Inaction on the Dutch phosphate quota markets prohibited the automatic reduction 
in animal numbers and associated manure that would have been generated by quota trade 
(because of the 75 % rule). Moreover, the hysteresis led to less environmental 
improvement. With trade, the farmer who acquires quota has to certify that he has either 
sufficient land on his own farm to dispose off the total manure for the next two years or 
has a manure disposal contract with another (crop) farm.  
The empirical evidence shows that the uncertainty generated by the process of a 
decision on alternative policies can be a serious deterrent to investment in marketable 
permits. Consequently, policy uncertainty incurs aggregate welfare losses because of   13 
misallocation of resources to produce the permitted output. For the specific case 
analyzed in this paper a system of leasing could be considered as an alternative to a 
system that only allows transfer through purchase. Leasing can be expected to increase 
the mobility of quota.  
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Table 1  Summary statistics of the data used in the estimation of the Dutch Phosphate 
Quota Model: April 1996-May 1998.* 
 
Variable Mean  Minimum  Maximum  Standard 
Deviation 
Quota price South (NLG per kg P2O5) 
Quota Price East (NLG per kg P2O5) 
Interest (%) 

















*   Monetary values in Dfl (1 Dfl = 0.5 US$). 




Table 2  Parameter estimates for the Dutch Phosphate Quota Model: Average and by 
region for two specifications, April 1996-May 1998. 
 
Average  Surplus Region South  Surplus Region East  Variable
a 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 













































































 c 0.00 
c 
Log likelihood  -1438.56  -1382.19  -861.52 -838.11 -508.88 -527.57 
Observations  269 269 166 166 103 103 
O as % of  mean 
discounted net returns 
57 52 48 44  116  94 
D as % of  mean 
discounted net returns 
 46  42  24 
a The variable definitions are C = the transaction cost of buying or selling quota; O =  is the option value 
of either acquiring or selling quota; D = policy change dummy July 1997-May 1998; σ ν
2  = 
 variance of ν  
error term; σ υ
2 = variance of υ  error term. 
* Significant at the 5 % level (two sided). 
b t-statistics in parenthesis. 
c Constrained to the [0,1] interval in the estimation. 
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Endnotes  
 
                                                        
i  Notice that this is another form of option value than that existing in the financial literature. In 
finance, an option represents the right, but not the obligation to buy or sell a stock on or before a 
given future expiration date (American option) or at a given time prior to this expiration date 
(European option). 
ii  A more detailed overview is given in Vukina and Wossink (2000). 
iii These standards were calculated as the difference between phosphate supply  (in feed, animals, 
fertilizer etc.) and phosphate removal (in meat, milk, eggs, animals, etc.). The residual is 
assumed to represent the phosphate content in manure.  For the assessment of the number of 
animals different dates were used: December 31, 1986 for pigs, poultry and cattle, and December 
1991 for sheep, goats, rabbits, ducks, foxes and nutria (Amvb Registratiebesluit dierlijke 
meststoffen Stb. 625, 1986). 
iv Using the inventory figures on animals from earlier assessments of the reference amount, each 
farm’s total manure quota (divided into the land-based part and the non land-based part) was 
partitioned into animal categories. This was accomplished by using a ranking scheme reflecting 
the extent to which keeping various categories of animals is truly land related.  Three classes 
were established: (1) cattle and turkeys, (2) sheep, goats, foxes, nutria and ducks, and (3) pigs, 
chickens or broilers. In the Netherlands, hog, broiler and other small animal farms are confined 
animal husbandry operations, while cattle farms are generally not, and hence cattle farming is 
more directly land related. As the result of this regulation, larger part of the non-land based 
(tradable) quota became allocated to pigs & chickens/broilers (Vukina and Wossink, 2000). 
v In the surplus regions average manure production is more than 125 kg P2O5 per hectare. With 
average manure production below the 125 kg of P2O5/ha threshold, the remaining part of the 
country is considered a manure-deficit region. 
vi As an example, consider a 3-hectare farm with 1,000 finishing pigs. The animal specific 
transfer coefficient for finishing pigs is 7.4 Kg of P2O5 per animal per year.  Therefore, this 
farm’s total reference amount is 7,400 Kg of phosphate per year. Given that the land based 
phosphate allowance is 125 Kg of P2O5 per hectare, the total reference amount is composed of 3 
× 125 = 375 Kg of land based quota and 7,400 – 375 = 7,025 Kg of animals based quota.  
Buying 1 hectare of additional land, would increase the land based quota to 500 Kg but would at 
the same time decrease the animal based quota to 6,900 Kg without changing the total available 
quota.  Consequently, this farm would have to buy additional 55.2 hectares (55.2 × 125 = 6,900) 
of land before the total quota available for production would go up. 
vii Art. 22-3 of the “Law regulating transfer of manure production rights” even states that the 
quota system will be terminated January 1, 1997. 
viii This was due to a debate whether the nutrient accounting/prohibitive tax system indeed would 
be capable of reducing the national manure surplus. Also additional research on the auditability 
of the scheme was requested as it was expected to be susceptible to fraud. 
ix The derivations follow Dixit (1989) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994: 167-172) were greater detail 
is provided.  